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Ownership Concentration and Performance 
in Ukraine’s Privatized Enterprises
ALEXANDER PIVOVARSKY*
This article investigates empirically the relationship between ownership concen-
tration and performance in 376 partially and fully privatized Ukrainian enter-
prises. It finds that ownership concentration is positively associated with
enterprise performance in Ukraine. The article also finds that concentration of
ownership by foreign companies and banks is associated with better performance
than ownership concentrated by the domestic owners. Ownership by Ukrainian
investment funds and holding companies does not have a positive effect on per-
formance. The article documents that, in contrast to predictions by many
observers of early transition, privatization methods determined the long-term
ownership structure of privatized firms. [JEL G32, G37, L33, P31]
I
n the last two decades of the twentieth century, major transfers of state-owned
enterprises into private ownership have taken place around the world. The
scope of such transfers has been especially significant in the countries undergo-
ing post-socialist transition (Nellis, 1998). These privatizations present a unique
opportunity for the study of the effects of corporate ownership structure on
enterprise performance. The ownership structures that were established in the
process of privatization in these economies are an outcome of political bargaining
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mentally different from the evolution of ownership structure in mature market
economies, which is an outcome of the interaction of market forces and leads to
an optimal long-run equilibrium (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Given poor capital
markets and the high transaction cost of changes of ownership in most transition
economies, the initial post-privatization ownership structures tend to persist,
thus providing an opportunity for testing a number of hypotheses on the role of
ownership structure in enterprise restructuring and performance. In this article,
I investigate the effects of ownership concentration on the post-privatization per-
formance of medium and large enterprises in Ukraine. Its main hypothesis is that
in Ukraine’s inadequate legal and regulatory environment, enterprises with
greater nonstate concentration of ownership perform better than those with a dis-
persed ownership structure.
This article is motivated by the debate on the effects of privatization. For the
industrialized and emerging market economies, there is strong evidence of the
positive effects of privatization on enterprise restructuring and performance. See,
for example, Vining and Boardman (1992); Megginson, Nash, and von
Randenborgh (1994); Boubakri and Cosset (1998); La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes
(1999); Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). The empirical evidence in the literature
on privatization in transition economies is, however, less conclusive. Consider
some examples of firm-level studies. For the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland, Frydman and others (1999) find that while privatization has no effect on
profit margins in the short run, it does lead to improved revenue performance. For
the Slovak Republic, Djankov and Pohl (1998) find that privatization is associated
with greater productivity and profitability as well as a number of other indicators
of restructuring. For a group of Central European countries, Pohl and others
(1997) find that privatization had a positive and significant impact on enterprise
productivity. For Russia, Earle and Estrin (1997) find no significant differences
between performance of state-owned and privately owned enterprises. For small
retail stores in Russia, Barberis and others (1996) find significant improvement in
restructuring after privatization. For six Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) countries, Djankov (1999) finds that state ownership is associated with less
restructuring, but the result is not statistically significant. For Mongolia,
Anderson, Lee, and Murrell (2000) find that state-owned enterprises perform bet-
ter than privatized firms do.
In the survey studies of empirical literature on privatization, Djankov and
Murrell (2000) and Megginson and Netter (2001) find that while privatization is
strongly associated with enterprise restructuring in Central Europe, the results
are mixed for the CIS countries. Several explanations have been offered as to
why privatization results have not been uniform across transition economies.
One strand of the literature has focused on the effects of ownership and control
granted to enterprise insiders on the firms’ performance and restructuring after
privatization. It has been argued that insiders are motivated by objectives other
than enterprise efficiency and, therefore, enterprise equity should be transferred
to outside owners to achieve better restructuring and performance (see, for
example, Aghion and Blanchard, 1996). A second strand of the literature has
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the ownership structure in explaining enterprise performance in transition
(Tandon, 1995; Anderson, Lee, and Murrell, 2000). Market reforms in transition
economies involved price liberalization and subjecting domestic enterprises to
international competition, and it is possible that firm-level and country-specific
differences in competition explain the variation in post-privatization perfor-
mance. A third strand of the literature has focused on the role of “soft budget
constraints,” a major enterprise governance problem inherent in the socialist sys-
tem (see Kornai, 1992 and 1995). 
The empirical evidence supporting all of these hypotheses has been limited
so far. For instance, Estrin and Rosevear (1999) find that insider-dominated firms
in Ukraine actually perform better than outsider-dominated firms. Earle and
Estrin (1996) obtain ambiguous results in their study of the role of competition
in enterprise performance in Russia. While some studies do find that enterprises
expect “soft” government support after privatization (Anderson, Korsun, and
Murrell, 2000), there is little evidence that soft budgets have an effect on post-
privatization enterprise performance. For example, Earle and Estrin (1998) do not
find a negative relationship between government subsidies and labor productivity
in Russia.
Recent literature on transition economies has focused on the interaction of
institutions and ownership structure for explanations of why privatization has not
been a success across the board. Today, after we have had a chance to assess the
early results of transition, a consensus is emerging that at the beginning of transi-
tion, more questions should have been asked—and answered—about how best to
privatize (see, for discussion, Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 2000). In this article,
I find evidence that supports some of the arguments made in this new literature and
focus on the degree of ownership concentration as an explanation of the variation
in enterprise performance. 
Ukraine was selected for this study for several reasons. First, like most transi-
tion economies, in the early 1990s it adopted an ambitious privatization program.
Second, Ukraine has made data on the identity and size of concentrated ownership
stakes in a large number of privatized enterprises available for research (the first
country in the CIS to do so). Third, the peculiarities of Ukraine’s privatization pro-
gram led to a variation in opportunities for initial ownership concentration. This
variation in proportions of equity privatized by different privatization methods can
be exploited to estimate the effects of ownership concentration on enterprise
performance. 
Using data on 376 medium and large enterprises, this study finds that owner-
ship concentration is positively associated with enterprise performance in Ukraine.
An instrumental variable approach confirms the article’s basic findings. For the
cross section of enterprises, the concentration of ownership by foreign companies
and banks is associated with better performance than ownership that is principally
domestic. Ownership by the Ukrainian investment funds and holding companies
does not have a positive effect on performance. This study also finds that, in con-
trast to predictions by many observers of early transition, privatization methods
have had a lasting effect on ownership concentration in Ukraine.
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ground and a review of related literature. Section II presents the data. Section III
presents results of ordinary-least-squares regression estimates of the ownership
concentration’s effects on enterprise performance. Section IV presents the argu-
ment for using proportions of equity privatized by different privatization methods
as instruments for current ownership concentration. Section V presents results of
two-stage-least-squares regressions, and Section VI concludes.
I. Background
For a long time, economic literature investigating the modern firm was domi-
nated by the image of a broadly held American corporation (see, for example,
Berle and Means, 1932). Its main focus has been on the corporate governance
problem, with the agency perspective as the central theme.1 A manager control-
ling the firm may not act in the interests of the owner, and such an agency prob-
lem may have a negative impact on enterprise performance. This problem may
be especially severe when ownership is dispersed among a large number of
shareholders. Researchers have found empirical evidence of the positive associ-
ation between ownership concentration and enterprise performance in the
United States (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Some authors have challenged that
traditional view of the effects of dispersed ownership structures on enterprise
performance. They have argued that ownership structure in a mature market
economy is the outcome of bargaining among economic agents and that any
association between ownership structure and performance is spurious at best
(Coase, 1937; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).
The problem of ownership concentration and its effects on enterprise perfor-
mance reemerged in the context of post-socialist transition. The privatization pro-
grams in transition economies have been an outcome of the political process that
did not necessarily lead to creation of “optimal” post-privatization ownership
structures (Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1996; World Bank, 1996). While govern-
ments contemplating privatizations had a mixture of objectives—including maxi-
mization of government revenues, attracting international and domestic capital,
and promoting enterprise restructuring and equitable distribution of wealth—the
political constraints often interfered with these objectives. It was considered
almost commonly accepted wisdom that privatization should proceed quickly,
regardless of the method used, in order to reduce the possibility of corrupt officials
benefiting from the control vacuum that emerged after the collapse of the planned
economic systems and to rule out the possibility of a communist comeback.
Driven by the political need for speed, many countries privatized thousands of
firms by widely dispersing share ownership with little consideration given to how
enterprises would be governed after privatization. It was expected, at that time,
that either the ownership structure would quickly evolve to attain an efficient
equilibrium, given the institutional and other constraints facing the firms, or the
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1I follow the definition of corporate governance provided in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), which deals
with the ways in which suppliers of finance to firms assure that they will get a return on their investments.institutional arrangements would evolve to support the post-privatization owner-
ship structure (see, for example, Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995). 
More recent literature on comparative corporate governance has focused on
the interaction of the institutions of investor protection and ownership structures
in determining firms’ access to investment finance. It was argued that a combi-
nation of legal rules and ownership concentration could be used to mitigate gov-
ernance problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It has been shown, however, that
even in mature market economies, the diversion of corporate resources from
minority shareholders to controlling shareholders and managers can be substan-
tial (see, for example, Johnson and others, 2000) and that corporations are
widely held only in countries with very good shareholder protection (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). In such countries, shareholders with
effective control over firms are not afraid that their firms will be expropriated
and, thus, they can afford to sell shares to raise new capital or to diversify risk.
At the same time, small investors can afford to take minority ownership interests
in firms when they know that managers or controlling shareholders will not
expropriate their ownership stakes. This new literature suggests that the tradi-
tional corporate governance paradigm, with its focus on the problem of moni-
toring and control of the firms’ managers by outside shareholders, is not
sufficient to address the enterprise problems of transition and of some other
emerging economies. In transition economies, small investors are not likely to
play an important role in providing new financing to firms in the near future,
owing to the institutional constraints (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer, 2000). At the
same time, practitioners who were involved in designing mass privatization pro-
grams in the region argue that outside governance mechanisms tend to be inef-
fective in transition economies and suggest that privatization should involve
mechanisms leading to direct enterprise monitoring by owners to achieve better
results (Frydman and others, 1997). This debate on the interaction of institutions
of investor protection and the ownership structure is relevant for the transition
economies: there is a mismatch between the institutions of investor protection
and the ownership structure that emerged after privatization. From this perspec-
tive, Ukraine is an excellent subject for a case study.
In December 1991, the Ukrainian parliament declared two key principles to
guide the privatization of state-owned assets: speed and social acceptability. To
fulfill these principles, the government opted for privatization methods aimed
primarily at establishing dispersed ownership of state-owned enterprises. The
parliamentarians envisioned that all citizens would participate in privatization.
Allocation of enterprises to investors who were capable of attracting new capi-
tal into firms or improving the quality of governance was not on the privatiza-
tion agenda at that early stage. The 1992 privatization law envisioned eight
privatization methods that differed in terms of the opportunities for ownership
concentration that were offered to potentially interested parties (described in
detail in Section IV of this article). Most small enterprises experienced a single
method of privatization. For medium and large enterprises (defined by the
Ukrainian government as enterprises that maintained independent balance sheets
before privatization), partial stakes were to be distributed via a combination of
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of medium and large enterprises involved their transformation from units of
ministries and government agencies into open joint stock companies. 
In terms of numbers of enterprises and workers involved, the privatization
efforts have been enormous. Between 1991 and 1998, the Ukrainian government
transferred formal ownership titles for more than 60,000 state-owned enterprises to
nonstate agents and the privatization program involved all sectors of the national
economy. The number of people employed by medium and large enterprises owned
by the central government declined from 13 million in 1992 to just over 5 million
in 1998. In terms of the share of capital assets employed by medium and large
enterprises, the magnitude of privatization was also significant. 
For political and historical reasons, the Ukrainian privatization during
1992–98 primarily involved mechanisms that led to dispersed ownership struc-
tures. Enterprise insiders were able to acquire a significant proportion of shares in
many firms. In most cases, the equity offered to outsiders was either transferred
into dispersed individual holdings or into the holdings of broadly held financial
intermediaries. State revenues from privatization as a share of GDP and total gov-
ernment revenues were insignificant owing to the nature of mass privatization,
which involved issuance of free privatization certificates. Only a small share of
equity was offered to owners interested in accumulating significant ownership
stakes, through such privatization methods as stock exchange or over-the-counter
sales and commercial and noncommercial tenders. 
The Ukrainian privatization took place in an economic environment that did
not lend institutional support to minority shareholders or investors in general.
After the collapse of the Soviet coordination and control system, Ukraine faced the
challenge of setting up a system of institutions that would support decentralized
investment and production. Corporate law had not existed for more than seven
decades. Unlike in neighboring Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, there
were no commercial codes that could be restored and no deeply ingrained social
rules or civil society supporting private ownership. As a result, today Ukraine has
weaker investor protection than the developed market economies and the more
advanced economies in transition.
Although by the mid-1990s Ukraine possessed a functioning legal and court
system, and its company law compared reasonably well with those of other coun-
tries,2 it was poorly equipped for administration of commercial law and contract
enforcement. The legal transition index of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), based on a survey of lawyers in the region, ranks coun-
tries on the basis of the extensiveness and effectiveness of their pledge,
bankruptcy, and company laws (EBRD, 1997). Ukraine scored 2 (on a scale from
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2La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) use six criteria to evaluate the quality of
shareholder protections, based on a country’s commercial law. They assign a cumulative score of anti-
director rights (between zero and six) by adding points if a country’s commercial code or commercial law
meets the criteria of minority shareholder protection. Ukrainian corporate law scores relatively well on the
anti-director rights index compared with those of other transition countries (Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer,
2000). Countries whose laws are based on the English legal system have the greatest degree of protection
provided to minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).1 to 4+) on both of their measures.3The 1997 Index of Economic Freedom, assem-
bled by the (U.S.) Heritage Foundation, assigned Ukraine a score of 3+ on a scale
from 1 to 4, which signifies a moderate level of protection of private property.4 On
the enterprise level, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (1999) conducted a survey
that asked managers in five countries (Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Romania, and
Russia) whether courts could be used to enforce contracts with customers and sup-
pliers. The percentage of managers who gave a positive answer was lowest in
Ukraine (55 percent).
Some scholars have recently argued that corporate law is not the most impor-
tant instrument of shareholder protection. For instance, Coffee (1998) has argued
that legislation governing securities and exchanges provides broader and more
effective rules for shareholder protection. Pistor (2001) has argued that investor
protection rules, such as rules of disclosure, mandatory takeover bids, and insider
trading rules, benefit investors in general and may be important in the develop-
ment of sound equity markets. Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer (2001) have argued
that government regulation of trading rules and financial intermediaries could sub-
stitute for commercial law in countries where property rights are poorly defined
and enforced. In terms of regulation of intermediaries, Ukraine is well behind
advanced market economies and its more advanced transitioning neighbors. The
Ukrainian Securities and Exchange Commission, established as an independent
government body in 1995, sets and enforces regulations for intermediaries and
trading rules. The existing regulations take a laissez-faire approach to individual
brokers, brokerage companies, and investment funds licensed by the commission.
The existing rules do not require “fair” practice or that intermediaries act in the
interests of their clients. Securities can be traded outside the control of the stock
exchange. There is no provision that would ensure a uniform price for the same
securities at the same time or wide distribution of information about securities
prices. Nor is there a regulation that would ban the fixing of securities prices.
According to a Global Competitiveness Report survey (World Economic
Forum, 1997 and 1999), business executives ranked Ukraine close to the bottom
of the list of nations when they were asked the question: “Are government regula-
tions precise and fully enforced?” A similar rating was achieved on the question
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3The EBRD index of extensiveness equals 1 if legal rules are very limited in scope, 2 if legal rules
are limited in scope and may be the subject of conflicting interpretations, 3 if amended legislation has
recently been enacted in at least two of the three areas (pledge, bankruptcy, and company law), 4 if com-
prehensive legislation exists in at least two of the three areas, and 4+ if comprehensive legislation exists
in all three areas and legal rules approach those of more developed countries. The index of effectiveness
of legal rules equals 1 if commercial rules are usually very unclear and contradictory and law enforcement
is rudimentary, 2 if commercial rules are generally unclear and sometimes contradictory and there are few
meaningful procedures in place in order to make commercial laws operational and enforceable, 3 if com-
mercial rules are reasonably clear but are not fully enforced by the court system, 4 if commercial law is
reasonably clear and administration and judicial support of the law is reasonably adequate, and 4+ if com-
mercial laws are clear and readily ascertainable.
4The score is accompanied by the following explanation: “Although its new constitution legally protects
private property, Ukraine has not yet fully established a legal system that sufficiently enforces the laws that
protect it. But recent government reforms in the judicial system are improving some courts. Some inefficien-
cies remain, however. Despite an ambitious government program to privatize large sectors of the economy,
property remains subject to government expropriation” (Johnson, Holmes, and Kirkpatrick, 1998, p. 447).of whether regulation and supervision of financial institutions was among the
most stringent in the world (see World Economic Forum, 1997 and 1999). In the
EBRD transition indicators for the quality of securities markets and nonbank
financial institutions, Ukraine ranked consistently close to the bottom (see
EBRD, 1997 and 1998).
In sum, the quality of institutions of shareholder and investor protection in
Ukraine is low by most available definitions. In capital markets that do not pro-
vide an easy exit option to small shareholders and possibilities for ownership con-
centration, the combination of the poor institutions of investor protection and
dispersed ownership structure should lead to a control vacuum and related corpo-
rate governance problems. My main hypothesis, therefore, is that in Ukraine’s
inadequate legal and regulatory environment, enterprises with greater concentra-
tion of ownership should report better performance than those with dispersed own-
ership structures.
There is some empirical evidence supporting my hypothesis for more
advanced transition economies. For example, Weiss and Nikitin (1998) find that
ownership concentration in the Czech Republic is associated with improvements
in the performance of companies, but only if ownership is concentrated in hands
other than those of investment funds. Claessens and Djankov (1999) find that for
a cross section of Czech firms, the more concentrated the ownership, the higher
the firm’s profitability and labor productivity. In contrast to the empirical
research done on the more advanced transition economies, this problem has not
been addressed in the empirical research done on former Soviet republics.
Nonetheless, the argument in favor of ownership concentration may be especially
relevant to the CIS countries. They were more likely than the more advanced tran-
sition economies to adopt privatization strategies that led to dispersed post-
privatization ownership structures (EBRD, 1997). Their equity markets are
nontransparent and illiquid (IFC, 1999). At the same time, the legal mechanisms
for effective corporate governance in these countries are not as well developed as
in the more advanced reformers of Central and Eastern Europe (Pistor and others,
2000). Thus, a study of the interaction of ownership concentration and enterprise
performance in Ukraine may explain, at least in part, the evidence that privatiza-
tion was not as successful in the CIS countries as it was in the advanced transi-
tion economies. 
II. The Data
This study is based on financial and privatization data covering a cross section of
376 medium and large enterprises. The 1998 balance sheet, financial statement,
and ownership data are from a database maintained by the Ukrainian Commission
on Securities and Financial Markets (UCSFM). Starting in 1998, the commission
required open joint stock companies to report all shareholders with 5 percent of
equity or more. For the first time since the beginning of the privatization in
Ukraine, both financial data and ownership data for a significant group of medium
and large enterprises were made available. The data on the privatization history of
enterprises, including privatization flows over time and the privatization methods
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The combined dataset is limited to medium and large enterprises for two reasons.
First, a significant majority of medium and large enterprises were transformed into
open joint stock companies before privatization. Many of the small and medium
firms, in particular those that insiders believed would be most attractive to outsider
takeovers, were transformed into closed joint stock companies, data on which are
not publicly available. Second, most medium and large enterprises, regardless of
their performance, possess the organizational capacity necessary to process their
financial statements before supplying them to the UCSFM in an electronic format.
Many small firms do not possess the same capacity. Thus, the sample would be
biased if small, open joint stock companies were included in the analysis, since the
UCSFM database covers only open joint stock companies that submitted their
annual reports in the electronic format. The sample selection is determined by the
variation in the dates when enterprises submitted their reports to the UCSFM and
it includes the data for enterprises whose reports were processed by the commis-
sion before the end of May 2000. This type of selection should not be related to
the variables of interest for this study. 
This study focuses on three measures of enterprise performance: total factor
productivity, material cost (per unit of revenue), and labor productivity. For mar-
ket economies, price of shares, Tobin’s Q, and profits are appropriate measures of
enterprise performance and have been used in the literature (see, for example,
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). These measures are not
available or are simply not appropriate for the study of enterprises in the transition
environment. While a large number of enterprises in Ukraine have been trans-
formed into corporations, most of them do not list their shares in the public mar-
kets. Even when these firms’ shares are listed, their liquidity is low, so the share
price and Tobin’s Q are not useful measures of performance. For a number of rea-
sons, profitability is not a reliable measure either. Reported profits are subject to
manipulation owing to changes in accounting conventions and to tax considera-
tions. The enterprises’nonstate owners may hide profits in order to avoid taxation
by the state. Recent studies found that transition economies, including Ukraine,
possess shadow economies that are among the largest in the world (see, for exam-
ple, Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996). While the historic cost of capital assets may
be sufficient to assess variation in the degree of capital intensity across enterprises,
it is not a reliable measure of the value of today’s capital stock. It needs to be borne
in mind that a significant share of firms’assets was accumulated before the begin-
ning of transition, when their value was based on the physical input costs of pro-
ducing them rather than market prices.
Frydman and others (1997 and 1999) advocate the use of strategic (revenue-
performance) and defensive (cost-performance) variables to measure enterprise
restructuring in transition economies. They argue that revenues are not only less
subject to manipulation than profitability and other conventional measures of per-
formance but also more transparent to an outside observer, more future-oriented,
and more unpredictable on the basis of past history (Frydman and others, 1997,
p.10). These authors used changes in enterprise revenues over time to assess effects
of privatization on enterprise performance. Since there are no reliable time-series
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Ukrainian enterprises, in this article I have identified an alternative approach to
studying cross-enterprise variation in revenue performance. Following Weiss and
Nikitin (1998), I use an approximation of total factor productivity, or Solow resid-
ual, as a measure of enterprise revenue performance. To generate this variable, I
assume that all enterprises employ a Cobb-Douglas production function and esti-
mate the following equation:
Ln (sales revenue in 1998)i = Constant + a ln Ki + b ln Li + ti (1)
where ln Ki is a logarithm of the value of enterprise balance assets, ln Li is a log-
arithm of the enterprise number of employees, and ti is an approximation of total
factor productivity. From this equation, I estimate ti for each firm by subtracting
predicted value of Ln (sales revenue in 1998)i from the logarithm of the actual
value of the 1998 sales revenues.5 Given the highly simplifying assumptions made
to derive this variable, and owing to the concerns with the quality of the capital
asset data, statistical results involving total factor productivity should be inter-
preted with caution.
To study the cross-firm variation in performance on the cost side, I focus on
the ratio of the cost of material inputs to sales revenues—a variable that reflects
well the managers’efforts to reduce variable input costs. Socialist enterprises fre-
quently hoarded material inputs, regardless of such a policy’s impact on their bal-
ance sheets. One of the objectives of privatization was to reduce managers’
incentives to hoard material inputs and to rationalize their utilization. The cost of
material inputs may also, in part, reflect the managers’ ability to use transfer-
pricing schemes to siphon off some of their firms’revenues into affiliated firms. I
would expect that the owners who are more capable of controlling such manage-
rial behavior achieve better material cost performance. 
Finally, I use sales revenues per employee (or labor productivity), a variable
that reflects both revenue performance and labor cost performance. The advan-
tage of this variable is that its derivation does not involve the value of enterprise
capital or other variables that may be subject to manipulation or historic valua-
tion problems. In addition, this variable reflects the enterprise manager’s ability
to trim the labor force to the minimum level necessary for the efficient function-
ing of the enterprise.
I focus on two measures of nonstate ownership concentration: first, the sum of
ownership stakes held by the top 10 reported nonstate owners (T10NS) and, second,
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5My derivation of the approximation of the total-factor-productivity variable is based on several sim-
plifying assumptions. First, I assume that all enterprises employ the same production function. Second,
I assume that all enterprises pay the same wages to labor and rents on capital. Finally, I assume that the
output price per unit is the same across all enterprises in the sample. Only output volume varies across
enterprises along with the variation in the volumes of inputs and enterprise-specific total factor produc-
tivity. Given these assumptions, the constant in the equation (1) includes a log transformation of the unit
output price. The predicted value of ln (sales revenue in 1998)i,predicted is derived by adding the constant
and the enterprise-specific values of a ln Ki and b ln Li, and, thus, leaving the total-factor-productivity
approximation ti out. From here, ti is derived by subtracting ln (sales revenue in 1998)i,predicted from 
ln (sales revenue in 1998)i,actual.a Herfindahl index of ownership concentration derived as a sum of squared values
of ownership stakes held by each of the top 10 significant owners and divided by
100 (HT10NS).
Before I turn to empirical analysis, let me add a few more words about the
sample enterprises. The vast majority of enterprises included in the sample did not
begin privatization before the end of 1994. By the end of 1998, the year of inter-
est for this study, 138 of the 376 enterprises were 100 percent privatized while the
rest were at different stages of the privatization process. Another 145 enterprises
were more than 50 percent privatized, a status at which nonstate owners could
exercise effective control over them. The enterprises in the sample with larger
numbers of employees were less privatized than the smaller ones. This is repre-
sentative of the situation in the economy as a whole. The sample includes a broad
range of firms by industry, reflecting the structure of the Ukrainian economy
before privatization. For instance, capital goods, construction, and basic
industries—the industries favored by the socialist-era planners—together consti-
tute almost 50 percent of all firms in the sample. The services, leisure, and
finance/real estate industries—the industries underdeveloped in the socialist era—
represent a small fraction of the sample.
The enterprises included in the sample represent a diverse group in terms of
their reported ownership structures at the end of 1998 (summarized in Table 1). Of
the whole sample of 376 enterprises, 184 have the state as the largest significant
owner of shares. The next largest group includes enterprises with other Ukrainian
companies as the largest significant owners. In most cases, these are limited-
liability companies established in the process of privatization with the primary
objective of hiding the identity of significant owners. The third largest group, of
46 enterprises, includes enterprises with no reported significant owners. “Physical
persons” are the largest significant owners of 30 enterprises in the sample. Foreign
companies and banks are the largest owners of 26 enterprises. The rest of the
enterprises have Ukrainian investment funds and nonstate holding companies,
Ukrainian enterprises-producers (that is, Ukrainian manufacturing enterprises),
and Ukrainian banks as the largest significant owners.
Table 1 also summarizes the numbers of firms in the sample that have each
type of owner, among the top 10 significant owners, and also the mean percentage
of equity owned by each type of owner when such an owner is present. The mean
value is highest when the largest owner is the state. On average, if the state is
among an enterprise’s top 10 owners, it controls 48.18 percent of all equity. For
the nonstate significant owners, the sum of ownership stakes ranges between
12.57 percent for Ukrainian banks and 22.46 percent for Ukrainian enterprises.
For the top 10 percent of firms measured by the size of the T10NS variable, the
largest ownership stakes are most likely to be held, first, by other Ukrainian com-
panies and, second, by foreign companies and banks. For fully privatized firms,
other Ukrainian companies are the largest significant shareholders (31.16 percent
of the fully privatized firms in the sample). For this subsample, the physical




































































Table 1. Ownership Structure1
Largest 
Largest Top  10  Significant  Owner Largest 
Significant Owner Significant Owners (Top 10 percent by  Significant Owner
(Entire sample) (Entire sample) nonstate concentration) (Fully privatized firms)
————————— ———————————————————— ————————— ————————
Mean percentage Mean percentage
Number  Percent  Number  of all firms’ of firm’s equity  Number Percent  Number Percent 
Type of Owner of firms of total of firms2 equity 3 for full sample of firms of total of firms of total
Physical person 30 7.98 69 21.71 3.84 2 5.41 24 17.39
Foreign company or bank 26 6.91 81 29.87 6.36 12 32.43 15 10.87
Ukrainian enterprise 4 1.06 9 22.46 0.52 ... ... 3 2.17
Ukrainian bank 2 0.53 11 12.57 0.37 1 2.70 2 1.45
Ukrainian investment fund
or holding company 24 6.38 77 19.55 3.93 6 16.22 13 9.42
Other Ukrainian company 60 15.96 118 25.5 7.87 16 43.24 43 31.16
Ukrainian state 184 48.94 205 48.18 26.22 ... ... ... ...
Dispersed ownership 4 46 12.23 ... ... ... ... ... 38 27.54
Total 376 100.00 ... ... ... 37 100.00 138 100.00
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
1All data are as of December 31, 1998. Only firms with 500 or more workers are included.
2The number of firms that have at least one owner of the type, among the owners with 5 percent of equity or more.
3The average share of equity owned by all owners of the type indicated, in firms that have at least one owner of the type among the owners with 5 percent of
equity or more.
4Dispersed ownership indicates that no owner is reported to hold an ownership stake equal to or greater than 5 percent of all equity.III. OLS Estimates of Ownership Concentration 
and Enterprise Performance 
The basic evidence on the relationship between ownership concentration and
enterprise performance comes from the cross-section regressions of the following
form:
yi = µ+ α Ri + γ Xi + ε i, (2)
where yi is a measure of enterprise performance for enterprise i, Ri is a measure of
ownership concentration, Xi is a vector of industry dummies and other covariates,
and ε i is a random error term.
The key coefficient of interest for this analysis is α , or the effect of nonstate
ownership concentration on enterprise performance. The coefficient is expected to
have a positive sign in the regressions on the total factor productivity estimate and
labor productivity and a negative sign in the regressions on material cost (per unit
of revenue). 
In previous literature, it has been hypothesized that the effect of ownership
concentration on firm performance may depend on the size of individual owner-
ship stakes. Previous authors have used either a linear combination of ownership
stakes held by a group of large shareholders (top 5, top 10, or top 20) or a trans-
formation of such combination that would give greater weight to large individual
ownership stakes (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Weiss and Nikitin, 1998; and
Claessens and Djankov, 1999). This article’s objective is to investigate whether
ownership concentration has an effect on performance and not to test the alterna-
tive theories on the functional form of this relationship. Given this, all empirical
models will be estimated for both types of ownership concentration indices—
linear (T10NS) and Herfindahl (HT10NS). I will expect similar empirical results
from these two measures of concentration, given their high degree of correlation.
(The correlation coefficient is 0.78.)
Columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 2 present the basic regression results for the
T10NS measure of ownership concentration and columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 3, for
HT10NS. All regressions include a set of industry dummies, and regressions of
cost performance and labor productivity also include a logarithm of the capital-
labor ratio to control for variation in capital intensity across firms. The empirical
evidence reveals that the higher the ownership concentration, the higher the total
factor productivity and labor productivity and the lower the material cost (per unit
of revenue). The coefficients on the ownership concentration variables have the
predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 90 percent level and higher
for all specifications.
For the basic regression specification, the coefficient α should be interpreted
as a marginal effect on enterprise performance of ownership concentration vis-à-
vis dispersed nonstate ownership and state ownership of equity. From a theoreti-
cal point of view, it might be appropriate to group together state ownership and
dispersed nonstate ownership. The agency problems of dispersed private owner-



































































Table 2. OLS Regression of Enterprise Performance on Linear Index of Ownership Concentration
Total Factor  Material Input Cost 
Productivity Estimate per Unit of Revenue Labor Productivity
—————————————— ————————————— —————————————
Full Full Sample PR98> Full Full Sample PR98>  Full Full Sample PR98>   
Independent Variables sample sample 50 percent sample sample 50 percent sample sample 50 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ownership concentration (T10NS) 0.0056* 0.0047** 0.0034*** –0.0022* –0.0025* –0.0025* 0.11** 0.12** 0.12**
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.00085) (0.0009) (0.047) (0.049) (0.48)
Dummy for state share 25.1–50 percent –0.099 –0.0025 –4.92
(0.13) (0.056) (3.24)
Dummy for state share 50.1–100 percent –0.21*** –0.056 0.33
(0.12) (0.52) (2.99)
Log (Balance assets/Number of employees) 0.0014 0.0063 –0.029 8.69* 8.63* 8.55*
(0.030) (0.30) (0.35) (1.73) (1.75) (1.84)
Industry dummies included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 374 374 280 374 374 280 374 374 280
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.40 0.41 0.40
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.






















Table 3. OLS Regression of Enterprise Performance on Herfindahl Index of Ownership Concentration
Total Factor  Material Input Cost 
Productivity Estimate per Unit of Revenue Labor Productivity
—————————————— ————————————— —————————————
Full Full Sample PR98> Full Full Sample PR98>  Full Full Sample PR98>   
Independent Variables sample sample 50 percent sample sample 50 percent sample sample 50 percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Ownership concentration (HT10NS) 0.012* 0.0099** 0.0086*** –0.0037*** –0.0041*** –0.0032 0.30** 0.31** 0.32*
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Dummy for state share 25.1–50 percent –0.10 0.00052 –4.97
(0.13) (0.056) (3.24)
Dummy for state share 50.1–100 percent –0.24** –0.03 –0.21
(0.12) (0.051) (2.92)
Log (Balance assets/Number of employees) –0.0016 –0.041 8.55* 8.54* 8.45*
(0.03) (0.035) (1.73) (1.75) (1.82)
Industry dummies included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 374 374 280 374 374 280 374 374 280
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.40 0.41 0.40
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.
Sample PR98>50 percent indicates that only enterprises with more than 50 percent of equity privatized as of the end of 1998 were included in the regressions.state closely resembles a corporation with a dispersed ownership structure. An
important empirical problem that is not addressed by this approach is how enter-
prises were selected for privatization. It is possible that the timing of privatization
was, in fact, endogenous to enterprise performance and that the state retained own-
ership in either the worst or the best enterprises. In order to control for this, I intro-
duce dummies for two levels of significant state ownership (the controlling stake
and the blocking stake) into the basic specification (reported in columns 2, 5, and
8 of Tables 2 and 3) and also undertake regressions for the sample limited to firms
with controlling stakes privatized (reported in columns 3, 6, and 9 of Tables 2
and 3). With both types of control, the coefficients on ownership concentration do
not change dramatically and remain statistically significant at the 90 percent level
or higher in five of the six cases. The only exception is the coefficient on HT10NS
for the material input cost per employee when the sample is limited to enterprises
with controlling stakes privatized as of 1998 (Table 3, column 6). Even in this
case, the coefficient has the predicted sign and a p-value of 14 percent. The rela-
tionship between ownership concentration and performance is significant in eco-
nomic terms. The ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression estimate implies that a
10 percent increase in ownership concentration variable T10NS leads to a 5.6 per-
cent change in the total factor productivity estimate. These regressions show that
a similar increase in ownership concentration would lead to a 2.2 percent decline
in the material input cost (per unit of revenue). An increase in ownership concen-
tration from the median value of the linear ownership concentration index
(15.2 percent) to the seventy-fifth percentile value (42.79 percent) would be associ-
ated with an increase in revenue per employee of 8,277 Ukrainian hryvnias (or more
than 30 percent of the mean value of sales per employee for the whole sample).
In the regressions described so far, all nonstate concentrated owners were
treated as a group and no distinction was made between the types of owners. The
theoretical literature and empirical evidence for other countries suggest that not all
concentrated investors are alike in their ability to establish effective enterprise
governance. This is particularly the case when authors compare the ownership
effects of domestic and foreign strategic investors. Thus, Claessens and Djankov
(1999) find that ownership concentration by foreign investors has a positive effect
on enterprise profitability in the Czech Republic. Frydman and others (1999) also
find that foreign investors perform better than domestic investors as owners after
privatization in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Another reason not to
lump all owners together is that some types of domestic owners themselves have
dispersed ownership structures and suffer from governance problems similar to
those of the enterprises they own. For instance, investment funds, which them-
selves possess a dispersed ownership structure, succeeded in gaining significant
ownership stakes in many Ukrainian enterprises during privatization. Previous
authors have found that investment funds perform poorly as owners (Weiss and
Nikitin, 1998; Claessens and Djankov, 1999). To explore the effects of different
types of concentrated owners, I differentiate among three types of nonstate signif-
icant owners: (a) Ukrainian investment funds and nonstate holding companies,
(b) other Ukrainian nonstate owners, and (c) foreign companies and banks. 
For each of the three ownership types, the ownership concentration variables
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fied owners among the top 10 nonstate significant owners. The coefficients on
each of these variables should be interpreted as marginal effects of ownership con-
centration by each of the three types of owner on enterprise performance vis-à-vis
the state and dispersed owners. 
The results of empirical tests by ownership type are reported in Table 4. For all
regression specifications, the coefficients on ownership concentration by Ukrainian
investment funds and nonstate holding companies are statistically insignificant and
have a negative sign for the labor productivity variable. This is consistent with the
findings in the empirical literature for other countries and also with the theory on
the role of ownership concentration in countries with poor institutions of investor
protection. Since the investment funds have dispersed ownership structures, they
suffer from agency problems similar to those of the enterprises they own. The con-
centrated ownership by foreign companies and banks has a strong positive effect on
enterprise performance for all measures of performance and in all regression spec-
ifications. The coefficients are larger in absolute terms than the coefficients from
regressions using the T10NS concentration variable (which did not differentiate
between the owner types). The concentration effects of other domestic significant
nonstate owners carry the predicted signs, but the coefficients’ statistical signifi-
cance varies, depending on the sample specification or the inclusion of additional
control variables in the regression equations. It is possible that foreign owners tar-
geted better-quality enterprises during and after privatization. If the concentration
effects were exclusively due to this type of selection, this would undermine my
argument about the role of ownership concentration on enterprise performance.
Since I could not test directly for this possibility, I tried limiting the sample to firms
that did not have foreign owners among the top 10 significant nonstate owners. For
this sample, the coefficients have the predicted signs and are statistically significant
for the total factor productivity estimate and for labor productivity. The coefficient
has the predicted sign but is not statistically significant at an acceptable level in
regressions for material cost (per unit of revenue). Thus, while I cannot completely
rule out the possibility of selection of enterprises by foreign owners, these tests
reveal that the ownership concentration effects are not exclusively due to ownership
concentration by foreign owners.
Overall, the cross-section regressions reveal that ownership concentration has
a positive association with performance of medium and large enterprises in
Ukraine. It also reveals that among the three groups of significant owners, con-
centrated ownership by foreign companies and banks is associated consistently
with better performance for all measures of performance. Ownership concentra-
tion by domestic owners other than the investment and holding companies has a
positive, but less robust effect on performance. This is possibly due to the greater
measurement error for the ownership concentration variable for domestic concen-
trated owners than for foreign owners. Finally, concentrated ownership by
Ukrainian investment funds and nonstate holding companies does not have a sta-
tistically significant effect on performance. 
One has to be cautious when interpreting the results of such cross-section



































































Table 4. OLS Regressions of Ownership Concentration by Owner Type
Total Factor Productivity Estimate Material Input Cost per Unit of Revenue Labor Productivity
——————————————— ———————————————— ———————————————
Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises
with no with no with no
Sample significant Sample significant Sample significant
Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign
Independent Variables sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
T10NSINF 0.0036 0.0020 0.0026 0.0032 –0.0008 –0.0012 –0.0014 –0.00099 –0.056 –0.032 –0.0054 –0.098
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0020) (0.002) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
T10NSFOR 0.0079* 0.0064** 0.0068** –0.0037* –0.0041* –0.0041* 0.24* 0.27* 0.29*
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.077) (0.081) (0.073)
T10NSDOM 0.0048*** 0.0025 0.0017 0.0063** –0.0016 –0.0020*** –0.0018 –0.0016 0.080 0.10 0.064 0.15*
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.063) (0.069) (0.60) (0.060)
Dummy for state share  –0.11 0.017 –0.81
25.1–50 percent (0.13) (0.055) (3.18)
Dummy for state share  –0.30** –0.043 2.82
50.1–100 percent (0.14) (0.060) (3.48)
Log (Balance assets/ 0.0053 0.011 –0.025 0.0061 8.29* 7.93* 8.03* 4.49
Number of employees)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (1.73) (1.77) (1.82) (1.66)
Industry dummies included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 374 374 280 294 374 374 280 294 374 374 280 294
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.31
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
Notes: OLS denotes ordinary least squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.
Sample PR98>50 percent indicates that only enterprises with more than 50 percent of equity privatized as of the end of 1998 were included in the regressions.structures and, thus, the causality goes in the direction opposite from that hypoth-
esized in this study. In order to address this problem, the next section will explore
an instrumental variable approach that uses equity shares privatized by different
privatization methods as instruments for ownership concentration during the
period of interest for this study.
IV. Privatization Methods as Determinants 
of Ownership Concentration
The cross-section regressions presented in the previous section may suffer from a
reverse causality problem. It is possible that ownership in better enterprises was
concentrated at the time of privatization or that they were more likely targets for a
post-privatization concentration. Previous authors used panel data analysis
(Frydman and others, 1999) or a difference-in-difference technique (La Porta and
Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) to address the problems of selection in the process of pri-
vatization. Given that no time-series, enterprise-level performance data corre-
sponding to the ownership concentration data are available in Ukraine, I have used
shares of enterprise equity privatized by different privatization methods as instru-
ments for current ownership concentration.
The privatization process in Ukraine has been an outcome of the interaction
of political forces and was, to a significant extent, controlled by enterprise insid-
ers. Workers’collectives and management were granted a major role in the design
and implementation of privatization plans for their enterprises. Even before
Ukraine’s independence in 1991, insiders as a group were allowed to lease their
enterprises, and, later on, they were allowed to transform leases into buyout
arrangements. There is evidence that workers’collectives of enterprises that were
perceived to have good chances of profitable operation opted for lease arrange-
ments early on and subsequently privatized better-quality enterprises (Kyryliuk
and Leshchenko, 2000). 
From the point of view of insiders seeking to preserve control over their enter-
prises, the privatization mechanisms had the following hierarchy: insider privati-
zation was most preferable, dispersed outsider privatization was next most
preferable, and privatization by concentrated outsiders least preferable. Given the
equity considerations traditional in Ukraine’s socialist society, outright concentra-
tion of ownership by the insiders was not politically acceptable. Enterprise man-
agers often had to disguise themselves as outsiders by establishing proxy legal
entities that would participate in the privatization auctions. Thus, the methods
most preferred by the insiders that were also feasible from the equity point of view
led to dispersion of the initial post-privatization ownership. The next-best privati-
zation methods from the insiders’ point of view were mass privatization methods
involving the issuance of privatization vouchers. For a given enterprise, only after
the insiders’ rights for equity privatization had been satisfied and privatization
voucher allocations had been made were relatively concentrated equity stakes
offered for privatization. This changed in 1999, when the government, interested
in generating additional budgetary revenues, shifted privatization efforts to meth-
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tion is outside the scope of the present study.
The early observers of transition anticipated that once property rights were
properly defined, the ownership of equity in privatized enterprises would be real-
located to the most effective users. This conclusion was based on a simplifying
assumption about the nature of capital markets in, and did not take into account
the realities of, transitional economies. Given the high transaction costs and infor-
mational asymmetries of Ukrainian capital markets, the initial ownership structure
has been sustained over time and, thus, the privatization methods used have deter-
mined, in large part, the enterprise ownership structure, even several years after
privatization. If this is indeed the case, we can use proportions of equity privatized
by different privatization methods as instruments for ownership concentration in
the regressions on enterprise performance. Schematically, my story can be sum-
marized as follows:
choice of privatization methods ⇒ initial post-privatization ownership
concentration ⇒ present ownership concentration ⇒ current performance.
Let us review in some detail the eight proposed instrumental variables that are
proportions of equity privatized by all of the privatization methods defined by
Ukrainian law. The data on privatization methods used is from the State Property
Fund database. The sample summary statistics for the proportions of equity priva-
tized by each of the methods as of the end of 1998 are provided in Table 5.
The first method—distribution of the tenant association property or shares
accumulated by the tenant associations engaged in lease-with-buyout
procedures—was used to privatize a significant number of enterprises and affected
the post-privatization ownership structure to a large degree. By 1991, thousands of
firms operated under such lease agreements. In April 1992, the Ukrainian parlia-
ment passed a law allowing enterprise insiders with lease agreements to acquire
equity in leased firms in exchange for profits generated by the enterprise and paid
to the state (Law on Leasing of Property of State Enterprises and Organizations).
As a result, insiders in a large number of primarily small and medium enterprises
succeeded in formally privatizing all of their enterprises’assets by the end of 1992.
Since valuation of enterprise assets did not keep pace with inflation (and, thus,
with the valuation of profits), insiders could acquire enterprises quickly and with-
out significant cash outlays. The ownership stakes in these enterprises were dis-
tributed among employees based on their positions and seniority in the enterprises.
Only in very small enterprises could individuals receive significant ownership
stakes. This method was phased out in 1995, when the government shifted its
privatization efforts to methods that involved the issuance and transfer of securi-
ties. For the whole sample, just over 14 percent of total equity was privatized using
the first method.
The second method—equity transfer on preferential terms—involved share
transfers to enterprise employees and limited categories of outsiders. Using priva-
tization certificates and cash, each current and former employee, as well as limited
additional categories of citizens (such as distinguished veterans of World War II),
could acquire from the state shares with a nominal value equivalent to 150 percent
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29of the value of a privatization certificate.6 Similar rights to purchase shares of
food-processing enterprises were given to farm employees. Members of manage-
ment teams could, as a group, acquire additional shares at their nominal value for
up to 5 percent of the enterprise’s total equity. A 1994 presidential decree intro-
duced an option that allowed management teams who completed corporatization
and submitted privatization plans to the privatization agency to purchase an addi-
tional 5 percent of the equity in their firms. Since this method allowed voluntary
participation by individuals, it was used to a greater degree for enterprises with
higher perceived quality. Individuals could receive significant ownership stakes
through this procedure only in enterprises with very small fixed capital. For the
full sample, just over 21 percent of total equity was privatized using this method.
The third method involved free distribution of shares. This method was rarely
used, since it was designed primarily for distribution of shares among agricultural-
input producers in a small number of food-processing enterprises. Individual
recipients of shares distributed through this method did not receive significant
ownership stakes. For the full sample, just over 2 percent of total equity was pri-
vatized using this method. The other privatization methods granted a greater role
to outsiders. In some cases, in particular when an enterprise had little registered
capital, the privatization agencies had to adjust the nominal value of shares that
could be acquired by insiders to make sure that each eligible individual could par-
ticipate in the process. This led to even greater initial dispersion of ownership
stakes in such enterprises.
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Table 5. Privatization of Enterprises in the Sample by Method1
(In percent)
Sample Sample 
Full Sample PR98>50% PR98=100%
—————— —————— ——————
Standard Standard Standard
Method Mean deviation Mean deviation Mean deviation
Property of association of tenants 14.34 26.6 17.84 29.07 21.37 30.69
Sales on preferential terms 21.41 22.21 24.13 24.01 27.79 26.69
Free transfer of shares 2.27 11.14 2.74 12.41 1.72 10.5
Privatization certificate auctions 17.93 18.4 20.62 19.48 22 21.22
Compensation certificate auctions 7.6 12.06 8.77 12.77 8.52 13.01
Stock exchange and over-the-counter sales 2.34 6.17 2.69 6.79 3.12 7.7
Cash sales via certificate privatization centers 0.74 2.72 0.53 3.02 0.66 3.69
Commercial and noncommercial tenders 6.83 14.56 8.48 16.01 8.53 16.39
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
1All data are as of December 31, 1998. Only firms with 500 or more workers are included. The full sam-
ple includes 363 enterprises; the sample of enterprises more than 50 percent privatized at the end of 1998
includes 281 enterprises; and the sample of fully privatized enterprises includes 137 enterprises.
6The March 1992 Law on Privatization Securities gave the citizens of Ukraine the right to open indi-
vidual nonnegotiable privatization accounts (which were later transformed into privatization certificates).
The certificates could be used for acquiring shares in an enterprise (or enterprises) of choice, and the face
value of each certificate was equivalent to 1/52,000,000 of the total book value of the assets privatized.The fourth method—privatization at the privatization certificate auctions—
was employed to privatize large ownership stakes in a significant majority of
medium-sized and large enterprises in exchange for privatization certificates. The
law envisioned the creation of two types of intermediaries—investment trusts and
investment companies—that could handle transactions with privatization certifi-
cates. Investment trusts were designed to assist individual holders of privatization
certificates in the acquisition of shares in individual enterprises. Investment com-
panies issued their own shares in exchange for privatization certificates.
Accumulated certificates were used to purchase shares in enterprises offered for
privatization. Since privatization certificates were nontransferable, and each citi-
zen was issued certificates equivalent in value to a small fraction of the total equity
being privatized, only licensed financial intermediaries were allowed to bid for
significant share packages. The law regulating financial intermediaries limited the
share of the total capital under the intermediary’s management that could be allo-
cated for shares in a single enterprise, thus limiting further the opportunities for
concentration. For the full sample, about 18 percent of total equity was privatized
using this method.
The fifth privatization method—privatization auctions for compensation
certificates—was introduced in 1994. These certificates were securities issued to
individuals whose deposits in the State Savings Bank and state insurance system
were devalued after the 1992 price liberalization. Like privatization certificates,
these securities could be used in the privatization auctions to bid at their face value
for equity in enterprises being privatized. In contrast to the privatization certifi-
cates, compensation certificates were tradable, and so enterprise insiders and out-
siders were allowed to purchase significant stakes using this privatization method.
Since no liquid market for compensation certificates emerged, broadly held inter-
mediaries remained the only realistic actors in the market for significant owner-
ship stakes at the compensation certificate auctions. For the full sample, just over
7 percent of total equity was privatized using this method.
The sixth method involved cash sales via the organized stock exchanges or
over-the-counter market and could lead to the creation of relatively concentrated
stakes by financial intermediaries, managers, and outsiders. A legal provision stip-
ulating that individuals purchasing significant ownership stakes must declare the
sources of their income complicated participation of physical entities in bidding
for shares. As a result, as anecdotal evidence shows, individuals chose to hide
behind newly created legal entities (primarily limited partnerships) when purchas-
ing shares. For the full sample, just over 2 percent of total equity was privatized
using this method. 
The seventh method—cash privatization via certificate privatization centers—
was similar to the previous method, with the only difference being the auctions’
location. These methods were used relatively rarely during the privatization—for
the full sample, less than 1 percent of total equity was privatized using this
method. 
The eighth method involved transfer of shares via commercial or noncom-
mercial tenders. Participants in the noncommercial tenders had to present business
plans but did not need to make any cash or privatization securities payments to the
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plans would be approved by the enterprises’ boards of directors. The business
plans were expected to lay out strategies that would increase enterprise employ-
ment or, at least, keep employment constant. Most of the time, labor collectives
won these noncommercial tenders, thus increasing the proportion of shares that
could be allocated among insiders, and the government rarely followed up on
whether the business plans were fulfilled. The commercial tenders were auctions
in which the highest bidders were given a chance to buy shares from the state with
a combination of cash and privatization and compensation certificates. Thus, they
tended to allow insiders and, in some cases, outsiders to gain control of shares in
addition to those that could be acquired using the other methods. This method was
more popular than cash sales, and, for the full sample, just under 7 percent of total
equity was privatized using this method.
As the previous discussion reveals, the privatization methods differed in terms
of the opportunities they provided for the initial ownership concentration. I
assume that the choice of the privatization methods was exogenous to current
enterprise performance and was related to current performance exclusively
through the methods’effect on current ownership concentration. As in most recent
privatization programs around the world, the cash received for the share offerings
in Ukraine always went directly to the government. As a result, any post-
privatization improvements in enterprise performance had to result from owner-
ship structure changes rather than from new cash resources made available to the
privatized firms through the share offerings.
Table 6 presents the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression results for the
two measures of ownership concentration versus the proportion of equity allocated
by each privatization method. The share of equity privatized at privatization cer-
tificate auctions is omitted to prevent collinearity. (The equity privatized by dif-
ferent methods would add up to the total percentage of equity privatized.) The
coefficients on the proportions of equity privatized by different methods have the
signs that would be predicted by the nature of each of the methods. The coeffi-
cients should be interpreted as the marginal effects of privatizing an additional per-
centage of enterprise equity using a specific method on the measures of ownership
concentration, compared with the effect of privatizing that equity at privatization
certificate auctions. These variables alone explain 31 percent of the variation in the
linear ownership concentration index (T10NS) and 21 percent of the variation in
the Herfindahl index (HT10NS). This indicates that the proportions of equity pri-
vatized by different privatization methods are good instruments for ownership
concentration at the end of 1998.
A word of caution is warranted on the exogeneity of these instruments. It is
possible that perceived quality of enterprises at the time of the design of their
privatization plans influenced the choice of a combination of privatization methods.
For example, for a sample of small and medium-sized Ukrainian enterprises,
Kyryliuk and Leshchenko (2000) find that in enterprises with better-than-average
pre-privatization performance, insiders privatized significant proportions of equity
through the dispersed-ownership schemes. It is possible that pre-privatization
enterprise performance also had an effect on ownership concentration for the
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tigated empirically. In any case, if the dispersed insiders indeed privatized enter-
prises of higher quality, and their initial performance does have an effect on
enterprise performance in 1998, we should observe a reduced effect of ownership
concentration on enterprise performance in the two-stage-least-squares framework.
Having identified a set of instruments for the current ownership concentration, I
turn again to the investigation of the relationship between ownership concentration
and enterprise performance.
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Table 6. Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) Estimates of the Extent 





Independent Variables Full sample Full sample
(1) (2)
Shares privatized using:
Lease with buyout 0.065 0.052*
(0.048) (0.020)
Preferential transfer –0.045 0.014
(0.055) (0.023)
Free transfer  –0.20** –0.033
(0.11) (0.045)
Compensation certificates 0.31* 0.051**
(0.10) (0.043)
Stock exchange 0.78* 0.18**
(0.19) (0.079)
Cash auctions 0.12 –0.082
(0.43) (0.18)




Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of
Ukraine.
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Only enterprises with 500 and more workers
are included.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.
1Share privatized for privatization certificates at privatization certificate auctions is used as a
numeraire.V. Ownership Concentration and Enterprise Performance:
Instrumental Variable Results
The original equation (2), as rewritten here,
yi = µ+ α Ri + γ Xi + ε i (2)
describes the relationship between ownership concentration and enterprise perfor-
mance in 1998. Further relationships can be written as
Ri = λ R + β RCi + γ RXi + υ Ri and (3)
Ci = λ C + β CPi + γ CXi + υ Ci, (4)
where Ri is a measure of ownership concentration in 1998 for enterprise i, Ci is a
measure of initial post-privatization ownership concentration, Pi is a vector of pro-
portions of equity privatized by each method for each enterprise, and Xi is a vec-
tor of industry dummies and other covariates.
Given that there are no reliable data on the initial ownership concentration
variable for the enterprise sample, my identification strategy will be to use the vec-
tor of proportions of equity privatized by each method for each enterprise included
in the sample as a set of instruments for current ownership concentration and
model Ri as
Ri = ξ + β Pi + δ Xi + υ i. (5)
I estimate equations (2) and (5) jointly using two-stage-least-squares
methodology.7
The basic results for the second-stage equation (2) are presented in Tables 7
and 8. Columns 1, 5, and 9 in Table 7 present the second-stage coefficients from
the two-stage regression for the T10NS measure of ownership concentration and
columns 1, 5, and 9 in Table 8—for HT10NS. All of these regressions include a set
of industry dummies, and the regressions of material cost performance and labor
productivity also include the log transformation of the capital-labor ratio to con-
trol for variation in capital intensity across firms. For the linear index of owner-
ship concentration, the coefficients α on ownership concentration have the
predicted signs in all cases and are statistically significant at the 99 percent level
for the total factor productivity estimate and material cost performance, but not
statistically significant for the labor productivity measure (p-value of 0.28). For
the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration, the coefficients α always have
the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 90 percent level or higher.
The relationship between ownership concentration and performance is signif-
icant in economic terms, too. The coefficients on the ownership concentration
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7In the first-stage regression, enterprise-specific proportions of equity privatized by different methods
are used to generate an estimated, or predicted, value of current ownership concentration for each enter-
prise. In the second stage, the predicted values of current ownership concentration are regressed on the
measures of enterprise performance. The ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates of ownership concentra-


































































Table 7. Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regressions of Enterprise Performance on Linear Index of Ownership Concentration
Total Factor Productivity Estimate Material Input Cost per Unit of Revenue Labor Productivity
——————————————— ———————————————— ———————————————
Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises
with no with no with no
Sample significant Sample significant Sample significant
Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign
Independent Variables sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ownership concentration  0.0098* 0.0073*** 0.0099* 0.0094** –0.0039* –0.0053* –0.0081* –0.0025 0.095 0.097 0.16 0.13
(T10NS) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.087) (0.11) (0.10) (0.097)
Dummy for state share 
25.1–50 percent –0.078 –0.0049 –0.63
(0.13) (0.056) (3.18)
Dummy for state share 
50.1–100 percent –0.17 –0.12 2.32
(0.17) (0.080) (4.53)
Log (Balance assets/ 
Number of employees) 0.010 0.030 9.68* 9.50 8.34 4.91
(0.034) (0.036) (1.92) (2.06) (2.11) (1.87)
Industry dummies included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 361 361 279 281 361 361 279 281 361 361 279 281
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.





















6 Table 8. Two-Stage-Least-Squares Regressions of Enterprise Performance 
on Herfindahl Index of Ownership Concentration
Total Factor Productivity Estimate Material Input Cost per Unit of Revenue Labor Productivity
——————————————— ———————————————— ———————————————
Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises
with no with no with no
Sample significant Sample significant Sample significant
Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign Full Full PR98>50 foreign
Independent Variables sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners sample sample percent owners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ownership concentration 
(HT10NS) 0.036* 0.031* 0.035* 0.047* –0.011** –0.014** –0.018* –0.0091 0.44*** 0.55*** 0.65** 0.71**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0046) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0072) (0.26) (0.32) (0.28) (0.32)
Dummy for state share 
25.1–50 percent –0.017 0.38
(0.059) (3.26)
Dummy for state share 
50.1–100 percent –0.083 4.14
(0.077) (4.25)
Log (Balance assets/ 
Number of employees) 0.015 0.30 0.019 0.0098 9.04* 8.44* 7.17* 4.30**
(0.035) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (1.97) (2.16) (2.20) (1.91)
Industry dummies included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 361 361 279 281 361 361 279 281 361 361 279 281
Sources: Ukrainian Commission on Securities and Financial Markets; State Property Fund of Ukraine.
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level of confidence.
** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level of confidence.
*** indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of confidence.
Sample PR98>50 percent indicates that only enterprises with more than 50 percent of equity privatized as of the end of 1998 were included in the regressions.variable increase if compared with the simple cross-section regressions of the total
factor productivity estimate and material cost performance using the linear index
of ownership concentration and for all three measures of performance in the
regressions using the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration. Thus, a 10 per-
cent increase in the ownership concentration variable T10NS leads to a 9.8 percent
improvement in the total factor productivity estimate. A similar increase in own-
ership concentration would lead to a 3.9 percent decline in the material input cost
(per unit of revenue). From regressions on the Herfindahl index of ownership con-
centration, the increase in ownership concentration from the median value of 1.49
to the seventy-fifth percentile value of 7.2 would be associated with an increase in
revenue per employee of 2,512 Ukrainian hryvnias (or approximately 10 percent
of the mean value of sales revenue per employee for the whole sample).
An empirical problem that does not get addressed by the instrumental-variable
approach is the enterprise selection for privatization by the state. In order to control
for the possibility that the state retained equity in the best- or worst-performing
enterprises, I introduce dummies for two levels of significant state ownership (the
controlling stake and the blocking stake) into the basic specification (reported in
columns 2, 6, and 10 of Tables 7 and 8) and also undertake regressions for the sam-
ple limited to firms with controlling stakes privatized (reported in columns 3, 7, and
11 of Tables 7 and 8). With both types of controls, the coefficients on ownership
concentration remain statistically significant at the 90 percent level or higher in all
cases with the exception of regressions of labor productivity on the linear index of
concentration.
The ordinary-least-squares approach generated evidence that enterprises with
concentrated foreign owners perform better than enterprises with concentrated
domestic owners. The instrumental-variable story presented in this study does not
address potential concerns related to selection of enterprises for concentration by
ownership type (foreign versus domestic). It is also possible that the foreign
investors acquired concentrated ownership stakes in better-quality enterprises after
privatization. Since I cannot address this question directly, I limit the sample to
enterprises with no significant foreign owners as a robustness check on the broad
conclusions about the effects of ownership concentration on performance. The
results for the limited sample are included in columns 4, 8, and 12 in Tables 7 and 8.
In all cases, the coefficients retain the predicted signs and do not change significantly
from those for the full sample. The statistical significance declines in the regression
of material input cost (per unit of revenue) for both measures of ownership concen-
tration. Given this, I cannot rule out the possibility that foreign investors improve the
cost performance of enterprises for reasons different from concentrated owners’
greater ability to resolve an agency problem than dispersed owners. 
Overall, this article finds that nonstate ownership concentration has a positive
effect on enterprise performance in Ukraine. The effect is especially strong when
performance is measured as an estimate of total factor productivity and labor pro-
ductivity (sales revenues per employee). The article also finds that, in contrast to
predictions made by many observers of early transition, privatization methods had
a lasting effect on ownership structure in Ukraine. Although the article also finds
that for a cross section of firms, concentration of ownership by foreign companies
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domestically, further study is needed to determine the channels through which for-
eign ownership affects performance and to address the possibility that foreign
owners acquired better-quality enterprises after privatization.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The article’s findings have several important policy implications. First, the article
questions the effectiveness of mass privatization methods that led to a dispersed
post-privatization ownership structure and suggests that privatization that grants
significant ownership stakes to single parties may bring about greater efficiency
gains than privatization that disperses ownership. Second, it finds that several
years after privatization, the ownership structures of individual enterprises depend,
to a significant extent, on the privatization methods used. Thus, if, owing to polit-
ical and equity considerations, the governments in transition economies have to
use privatization mechanisms leading to dispersed ownership, they should con-
sider creating appropriate conditions for ownership reallocation to make privati-
zation work. Third, the cross-section regression results reveal that ownership
concentration by foreign companies and banks is positively associated with enter-
prise performance. If foreign companies and banks indeed perform better as own-
ers, perhaps the governments should consider attracting foreign investors for
participation in future privatizations and making the institutional environment
conducive to foreign direct investment.
My argument in favor of privatization that grants concentrated ownership
stakes is based on the observation that the institutional environment in Ukraine is
not conducive to the protection of investors (whether foreign or domestic) and
exacerbates the agency problems associated with dispersed ownership. From this
perspective, my results should be interpreted as promoting a second-best solution.
If a country possesses an appropriate institutional environment for investor pro-
tection, the agency costs of dispersed ownership may be outweighed by the bene-
fits of the risk diversification and access to capital afforded by the arm’s-length
capital markets. This second-best approach does not address the legitimate equity
concerns regarding privatization. These concerns can be addressed in a number of
ways, including by improving the quality of institutions of investor protection,
increasing the transparency and liquidity of the capital markets, and transferring
most privatization revenues to the public. 
It is important to stress that a number of important questions remain. First, the
study’s empirical evidence did not identify all the channels through which owner-
ship concentration affects performance. I have argued here that ownership con-
centration affects performance by addressing the agency problems. However, one
can think of several other channels through which ownership concentration affects
performance. First, concentrated owners may reinvest more profits than dispersed
owners and, thus, increase their enterprises’ productivity. Second, concentrated
investors (especially foreign investors) may have better access to new technology.
Third, concentrated investors may be better at replacing incompetent managers
with competent new ones. In any case, the findings show that ownership concen-
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channels through which this effect is transmitted. From a policy perspective,
though, the lessons are more straightforward: it is a good idea to privatize con-
centrated stakes, at least until the government is able to improve capital market
infrastructure and institutions for investor protection.
This study’s findings are also important for other reasons. First, a significant
share of Ukraine’s capital assets is still owned by the state and, thus, the findings
have implications for the design of the future privatization efforts in Ukraine.
Starting in late 1999, medium-sized and large enterprises have been privatized by
selling large packages of shares. The government has invited foreign investors to
participate in privatization tenders. Some critics of the government have argued
that this new approach is a result of the urgent need to increase government rev-
enues and not of a careful search for an effective privatization model. The good
news is that in this instance the political process may have a positive side effect on
the Ukrainian economy. Second, the results for Ukraine may be generalized to
other countries in the region. Ukraine’s privatization program was similar to those
adopted by other CIS countries, which possess similar institutional environments
for arm’s-length corporate governance (World Bank, 1996; EBRD, 1998). Finally,
the study’s findings may be useful for designing privatization programs in coun-
tries yet to embark on such efforts (such as Belarus, China, Cuba, and Vietnam).
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